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Abstract 
This paper studies the influence of different national institutions on corporate 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance through the varieties of 
institutional systems approach. This research complements previous research that used 
traditional approaches such as the national business systems and the varieties of 
capitalism, because it considers companies in under-studied economies in Asia, Africa, 
Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Latin America. To that aim, a dataset of 4,751 
firms within 52 countries is examined through a multilevel model, which allows 
establishing three levels of analysis: i) yearly observations of a firm ESG performance, 
ii) the companies; and, iii) the countries. This technique is useful to address the nested 
nature of firms’ ESG performance within higher-level institutional contexts. The results 
identify which specific national institutions enhance/restrict companies’ ESG 
performance. This provides interesting implications because firms’ ESG represent most 
of the companies’ contributions to environmental preservation, social well-being and 
community development. 
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1. Introduction 
In a globalized world, where sustainability issues have global importance, there is a 
need to understand how countries stimulate or restrict companies’ contributions to 
sustainable development and social well-being. These contributions have been 
conventionally measured through firms’ environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
performance that is driven by differences in national institutions (Ioannou & Serafeim, 
2012; Shahzad, Rutherford & Sharfman, 2016; Gallego-Álvarez & Quina-Custodio, 
2017; Ortiz-de-Mandojana, Aguilera-Caracuel & Morales-Raya, 2016). Previous 
research (Duran & Bajo, 2014; Kang & Moon, 2012; Kyaw, Olugbode & Petracci, 
2017; Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010) addressed how firms’ ESG performance vary as a 
function of differences in national institutional frameworks through two extensions of 
the institutional theory: i) the National Business Systems (NBS); and, ii) the varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC). However, these approaches are not able to address systemic 
differences in national institutions of countries having a significant impact on global 
sustainability (e.g. those in Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Latin 
America). This paper addresses this gap and analyzes how national institutions 
influence companies’ ESG performance through the Varieties of Institutional Systems 
(VIS) approach, which is a novel extension of the Institutional Theory. The VIS 
framework, proposed by Fainshmidt, William, Aguilera and Smith (2018), captures the 
broader institutional context provided by the state, financial markets, human capital, 
social capital and corporate governance institutions. 
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first that focuses on the 
VIS approach to determine the influence of national institutions on firms’ ESG 
performance, providing a wider and more consistent overview. This research aims to 
complement the findings of previous papers addressing the national antecedents of 
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firms’ ESG performance (Baughn, Bodie & McIntosh, 2007; Erdiaw-Kwasie, Alam & 
Kabir, 2007; Murillo-Luna, Garcés-Ayerbe & Rivera-Torres, 2008; Welford, 2004, 
2005) which mostly focus on a restricted number of companies operating in a reduced 
sample of countries. This paper addresses the nature of cross-national differences and its 
impact on firms’ ESG performance by examining a dataset of 4,751 companies, 
monitored for eight years (2008-2015), and operating in 52 countries. A multilevel 
model is implemented with the aim of capturing the within-cluster dependence feature, 
which is often present in datasets of companies in different countries under the same 
institutional constraints.  
This paper contributes to the existing research on the national institutions – firms’ 
ESG performance link in different ways. Firstly, this paper addresses in which ways 
some understudied national institutions, mainly present in emerging countries, enhance 
or restrict corporate ESG performance. In fact, the focus on the VIS approach will allow 
understanding more clearly how companies’ adapt their sustainability practices, policies 
and performance from a worldwide perspective. This is because the VIS approach 
captures the existence of further national institutions in understudied countries, which 
are predicted to have a significant influence in the world economy in the near future 
(e.g. the BRICS countries). Although recent studies (Arrive & Feng, 2018) addressed 
the influence of business laws and regulations on corporate sustainability issues in 
emerging countries, there is a need to conduct research directed to capturing the above-
mentioned relationship from a global perspective. Secondly, although existing research 
(Ringov & Zollo, 2007; Gallego-Álvarez & Ortas, 2017) identified national culture as 
the country-level driver of companies’ ESG performance, we respond to a recent call 
made by Hartmann & Uhlenbruck (2015) who highlight the need to ascertain the 
influence of specific understudied national institutions on corporate ESG performance 
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(e.g., family ownership and the role of the state). Thirdly, although most of previous 
research (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007; Campbell, 2007) measure 
corporate ESG performance as a global construct, they are not able to explain how 
national institutions boost or restrict specific dimensions of firms’ ESG performance, 
those being: i) corporate environmental performance (CEP); ii) corporate social 
performance (CSP); and iii) corporate governance performance (CGP). Accordingly, 
this paper captures in which ways the differences in national institutions influence 
firms’ environmental, social and governance performance. In fact, aggregating the CEP, 
CSP and CGP in a unique measure can compensate or neutralize the effect of national 
institutions on corporate ESG performance. Thus, this paper offers a fine-grained 
overview about the influence of national institutions on CEP, CSP and CGP. Fourthly, 
we respond to a recent call made by Aguinis & Glavas (2012) about the need to 
implement multilevel research in sustainability studies with the objective of accounting 
for the nested nature of firms’ ESG performance within higher-level institutional 
contexts and constraints. Accordingly, a multilevel model is implemented with the aim 
of: i) capturing the within-cluster dependence often shown by databases of firms from 
different countries and under similar institutional constraints; ii) overcoming mis-
estimation problems derived from sampling fluctuations and a small number of 
observation through higher levels of analysis; and, iii) managing the variability of firms’ 
ESG performance into three levels of analysis (i.e., across observations within 
companies, across companies within countries, and across countries). This will provide 
the ability to estimate unbiased coefficients and standard errors, thus enhancing the 
results’ robustness.  
Main results reveal that national institutions have a significant influence on 
corporate ESG performance. In fact, enhanced knowledge and social capital stimulate 
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firms’ ESG performance. Equity and/or credit markets are more efficient channels to 
ameliorate companies’ willingness to engage in sustainability practices than 
mechanisms provided by the state as the primary source of firms’ financing. Finally, the 
role of the family in companies’ management also have an influence on companies’ 
ESG performance. Specifically, enhanced family ownership lowers firms’ performance 
in community issues but positively influences firms’ performance in aspects such as 
diversity, employees and environmental issues. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The second section introduces 
the theoretical foundations. The third section reviews existing research on the topic and 
presents the research hypotheses. Section 4 shows the main features of the research 
method, sample and variables. The results are discussed in Section 5, and finally, 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. National institutions and corporate ESG performance 
Existing research largely addressed that corporate decisions, behavior and performance 
is highly influenced by countries’ institutional environments (O'Reilly & Chatman, 
1996; Sirmon & Lane, 2004; Williams & Aguilera, 2008). This has been studied by the 
New Institutionalism (Westney, 1993; Rodrigues and Craig, 2007; Jackson & Deeg 
2008; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013) which explains how differences in countries’ 
institutional constraints determine companies’ internal structures, processes, decisions 
and performance. In fact, Brammer, Jackson and Matten (2012, p. 8) reveal that 
“institutional theory provides a formidable lens for understanding and explaining how 
and why corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities assumes different forms in 
different countries”. This approach allows understanding the reasons driving 
corporations’ decisions through three isomorphisms (Zucker, 1977; Rosenzweig & 
Nohria, 1994), those being: i) coercive isomorphism, which results from formal (e.g. 
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laws) and informal (e.g. agreements, codes of conduct) pressures exerted on 
organizations by influential others or by the cultural beliefs of the society in which they 
conduct their activities; ii) normative isomorphism, which results from the 
professionalization of decision-makers in companies and addresses how they face some 
problems in similar way; and, iii) mimetic isomorphism, which analyses how 
uncertainty can prompt organizations to mimic their peers. 
The first two isomorphisms (i.e., coercive and normative) allow addressing how 
companies under similar/different institutional constraints adopt similar/different CSR 
initiatives and practices that ultimately determine their ESG performance (Boiral, 2007; 
Blasco & Zolner, 2010; Crossland & Hambrick, 2011). This can be explained because 
organizations are embedded within broader social structures, comprising of different 
types of institutions that exert significant influence on their decisions and outcomes 
(Campbell, 2007; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Horak, Arya & Ismail, 2018). This has 
been addressed by the VIS framework, which aims to develop a more accurate 
explanation of national institutional contexts. In fact, the VIS approach provide a 
broader institutional context that allows having proper frameworks to investigate 
different regions, and understanding why firms that are embedded in different nation-
level institutions obtain different levels of ESG performance. The main emphasis in this 
area is focused on the distinctive nature of the national institutional contexts in which 
firms operate in terms of aspects such as the legal system and government, sources of 
financing and capabilities, or educational systems. The VIS responds to a recent call 
made in academic literature (Schneider & Paunescu, 2012; Witt & Redding, 2013) 
which indicated the necessity of explaining the nature and consequences of systemic 
variations in national institutions of an increasingly important group of countries of 
newly developed, emerging and developing economies. In essence, the VIS moves 
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beyond the VoC and NBS perspectives and offers an overview of how companies’ 
practices and strategies are influenced by national institutions by including economies 
from Asia, Africa, East Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America. According with 
the previous reasoning, this paper focuses in the VIS approach instead of the 
conventional VoC and NBS frameworks. This will provide the ability of addressing the 
role of some national institutions that are present in many economic systems that have 
recently emerged around the world. 
Academic interest in the effects of national institutions on business management 
and performance is not new (Brammer, Brooks, & Pavelin, 2006; Malen & Vaaler, 
2017; Carney, Dieleman & Taussig, 2016) but it is increasingly important in a 
globalized world (Venaik & Brewer, 2010). Stakeholder demands and institutional 
constraints increase when companies diversify their operations and access to new 
markets (Jackson & Deeg, 2008), due to differences in countries’ cultural, social, legal 
and economic systems (Sharfman, Shaft & Tihanyiu, 2004). Previous research has 
addressed this in several ways (Yong, 2008; Ortas, Alvarez, Jaussaud & Garayar, 2015). 
Some authors (Ringov & Zollo, 2007) describe the influence of cultural differences on 
companies’ ESG performance. Other research (Chapple & Moon, 2005) finds that 
cross-country variation in ESG performance cannot be explained by cultural and 
economic differences, and highlight the role played by national institutions.  
Aguilera et al. (2007) argue that companies are under different degrees of internal 
and external pressures to commit to CSR activities as a result of their exposure to 
divergent institutional systems. They state that shareholders in Anglo-American 
countries will promote ESG performance when short-term benefits are obtained, but 
shareholders in the European model will encourage such activities focusing on the long 
term to benefit all stakeholders. Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) use the NBS approach to 
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analyze how companies’ ESG performance is driven by differences in countries’ 
national institutions and find differences in CSP and CEP that might been driven by 
differences in countries’ national institutions. Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) analyze 
the effects of national institutions on European firms’ CSR activities, and conclude that 
companies from LMEs perform at lower levels of CSR than firms in CMEs.  
Meyer (2011) carried out a study to explain how national institutions affect 
international companies’ CSR activities (focusing on environmental efforts), and found 
that firms had better CEP in less coordinated market economies. Moreover, that 
research reveals that environmental issues are influenced by institutional differences 
between countries. 
More recently, Hartmann and Uhlenbruck (2015) examined a database of 2,724 
international firms to analyze the influence of countries’ national institutions on CEP. 
They argued that studying several dimensions of firms’ ESG performance “will allow 
for a more complete understanding of how institutions affect firms and how this plays 
out in different countries” (Hartmann & Uhlenbruck, 2015: 729). The focus was on CEP 
drivers and the following institutional factors were controlled: i) the number of 
environmental treaties signed and ratified by a country; ii) the degree of market 
freedom; and, iii) the number of active NGOs in the countries and the degree of press 
freedom. 
Further research in the field (Aaronson, 2003; Musacchio, Lazzarini & Aguilera, 
2015; Witt & Jackson, 2016) suggest that more empirical evidence is required to 
understand better how companies adapt to their national institutions (Swedberg, 2014; 
Boschma & Capone, 2015). 
3. Hypotheses development  
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This section motivates the research hypotheses. According with the VIS, the section is 
structured into the five dimensions that are supposed to influence companies’ behavior 
and outcomes, such as ESG performance.  
3.1. The role of the state 
Previous research addresses three ways of state intervention into the economies 
(Whitley, 2003): i) directly, when the state is actively and directly involved in economic 
production through state-owned enterprises; ii) indirectly, through the provision of 
capital, favoritism or participation in corporate governance; and iii) through the general 
stance it takes towards national economic life. According to the kind of state 
intervention, Fainshmidt et al. (2018) identifies four types of countries: i) regulatory, ii) 
developmental; iii) predatory; and iv) welfare states. Regulatory states, such as the US, 
establish and enforces the rules of businesses, in particular the protection of property 
rights. Developmental states, such as Brazil and Taiwan, are characterized by 
substantial control over the economy mainly by focusing on long-term national interests 
and participating in the development of business sectors through industrial policies. 
Predatory states, such as Eastern Europe countries, are mostly governed by elites who 
monopolize power with opaque decision-making processes. They often show weak 
institutions and lack of market competition. Finally, welfare states, such as most of the 
countries in Northern Europe, focus on the promotion and protection of the social and 
economic welfare of their citizens. 
 Previous research addressed that “a strong state is perceived as having 
comprehensive policies and regulation on environmental preservation and thus firms 
located in such countries are better prepared to meet and even exceed regulatory 
prescriptions” (Hartmann & Uhlenbruck, 2015, p. 732). This suggests that regulatory 
systems will influence companies to exhibit higher levels of ESG performance. This can 
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be explained because regulatory states will enforce compliance with existing social and 
environmental regulation (Matten & Moon, 2008). In fact, Rugman & Verbeke (1998) 
address that regulations should support firms’ ESG performance if they focus on 
complementing rather than contradict financial goals. Further research (Lim & Tsutsui, 
2012) reveal that those firms within countries providing strong regulation and showing 
a commitment to international treaties will be more likely to engage with CSR practices, 
thus increasing their ESG performance. This reasoning suggests that firms operating in 
regulatory countries will be more likely to adopt CSR strategies to respond to and 
comply with regulatory demands. Accordingly, the following hypotheses will be tested: 
H1: Strong social and environmental regulations, such as present in regulatory 
states, will positively influence firms’ ESG performance levels. 
3.2. The role of financial markets 
Companies obtain financial resources mainly through: i) equity markets; ii) credit 
markets; iii) the family; and, iv) the state. According to the VIS, companies’ ability to 
implement stakeholder relationships is influenced by market institutions. In some 
countries, such as the US, the equity and credit markets are the central financial source 
of companies, which often show a high degree shareholder dispersion. In contrast, in 
some countries, such as China, the state acts as a supplier of financial resources for 
companies because the state has owned the factors of production or financial institutions 
(Lazzarini, Musacchio, Bandeira-de-Mello & Marcon, 2015). Moreover, in economies 
where financial markets are relatively underdeveloped, such as in Arab countries, firms 
tend to rely on domestic capital markets based on accumulated family wealth (Steier, 
2009). When states and/or families assume the role of capital provider, they replace 
financial markets and inhibit their development (Schneider, 2009). 
 Previous research reveals that those companies within countries having 
developed credit and equity markets can develop innovative management practices 
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because they are less restricted by economic actors (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Thus, 
companies are more likely to include sustainability issues into their operations that 
increases their ESG performance, such as developing greener production processes that 
lower emissions, waste and energy consumption (Berrone, Fosfuri, Gelabert & Gomez-
Mejia, 2013). Furthermore, in this kind of countries, customers strongly influence firms’ 
behaviour, normally by demanding a more responsible firm behaviour (Christmann, 
2004; Klassen & Vachon, 2003). Under this scenario, companies have more incentives 
to implement socially responsible business models that are supposed to ameliorate 
firms’ ESG performance. According with this reasoning, the following hypothesis is 
proposed to be tested: 
H2: Developed credit and equity markets will positively influence firms’ ESG 
performance levels.  
3.3. The role of human capital 
A country’s human capital will also have an influence on companies’ ESG performance, 
and can be examined trough the level of knowledge capital and coordination with labor. 
The level of knowledge capital helps to explain how organizations engage with 
employees in productive activities. When knowledge capital is collectively available to 
firms in an economy, organizations can invest in firm-specific skills such as training 
and development, health and safety, diversity, and opportunity programs (Jackson & 
Deeg, 2008) often related with increased ESG performance. On the other hand, 
shortages of knowledge capital can reduce incentives to invest in particular capabilities 
and employee satisfaction (Schneider, 2013).  
 Organizations attracting qualified job seekers have a larger pool of applicants, so 
their selection system can function to produce competitive advantages (Strandberg, 
2009). Coordination with labor is the second sub-dimension of a country’s human 
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capital. Research (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2004; Hall 
& Soskice, 2001) suggests that countries with a strong labor organization often have 
longer-term investments and are more likely to prioritize social and environmental 
concerns (Locke & Thelen, 1995; Ioannou & Serafin, 2012). On the other hand, 
countries with more fragmented labor markets have less collective action, and human 
resource management is mostly based on connections to family elites and political 
decisions. 
Accordingly, the following hypothesis will be tested: 
H3: Enhanced knowledge capital and coordination with labor will positively 
influence firms’ ESG performance levels.  
3.4. The role of social capital 
The ability of a society to produce social capital “is determined by its long-term 
experience of social organization, anchored in historical and cultural experiences that 
can be traced back over very long periods” (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008: 442). 
Traditionally, countries fostering economic equality experience higher levels of trust, 
regardless of the level of economic development (Uslaner, 2008). Generalized trust is an 
indicator of countries’ social capital, which refers to the extent to which members trust 
other members of society and society in general. Confidence tends to be high in 
countries that belong to the typologies of VoC and NBS as compared to countries in 
other regions (e.g. Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia). 
 In developmental and emerging markets in particular, trust is usually lower 
because of widespread corruption and an ineffective state. Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) 
revealed that firms’ ESG performance is higher in countries with low levels of 
corruption. A connection should be expected between countries’ social capital and 
companies’ ESG performance. This is particularly important for this study because the 
VIS framework includes countries with developmental and emerging markets, which 
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were not considered by the VoC and NBS systems. Kong (2016) identifies significant 
variations in trust and corruption levels across countries. According with this reasoning, 
the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H4: Enhanced generalized trust will positively influence firms’ ESG performance 
levels. 
3.5. The role of corporate governance 
Three elements define how companies are controlled and managed, those being: i) 
concentration of ownership; ii) family ownership; and, iii) family intervention in 
management. Ownership concentration is an important element of the institutional 
context since it indicates how owners, workers and management interact with each other 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Family ownership is also important for corporate 
governance, and dominates most sectors in the economies of Latin America, the Middle 
East, North Africa and parts of Asia.  
High ownership concentration has traditionally been negatively connected with 
firms’ ESG performance (Dam & Scholtens, 2013; Barnea & Rubin, 2010). This is 
because large shareholders tend to dominate firms’ boards, which reduces directors’ 
diversity and independence. Recent research (Block & Wagner, 2014) argues that 
family firms can be responsible or irresponsible to various dimensions of ESG 
performance. In essence, family firms, in general, are more prone to prioritize employee 
satisfaction, diversity, environmental concerns and product related issues. This last 
dimension is also of special interest because family companies are especially important 
in one of the fastest growing regions in the world, Asia, which is included in the 
analyzed sample. The following hypothesis will be tested: 
H5: Low levels of ownership concentration and high levels of family ownership 
and family intervention will positively influence firms’ ESG performance levels. 
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4. Research design 
4.1. Sample description 
Research shows that firms’ ESG performance “is a construct that emphasizes a 
company’s responsibilities to multiple stakeholders, such as employees and the 
community at large, in addition to its traditional responsibilities to economic 
shareholders” (Turban & Greening, 1997: 658). Companies’ ESG performance is “a 
business organization's configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes of 
social responsiveness, and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to 
the firm's societal relationships” (Wood, 1991: 693). Because some national institutions 
have differential impacts on some dimensions of companies’ ESG performance, this 
research focuses on three of the main dimensions of the construct (Huseynov & Klamm, 
2012; Lo & Kwan, 2017); i) CEP; ii) CSP; and iii) CGP. 
Data related to firms’ ESG performance was obtained from the ASSET4 ESG 
dataset of DataStream®, provided by Thomson Reuters. This database “provides 
objective and systematic ESG performance data according to more than 280 key 
performance indicators and 750 individual data points. The original data sources include 
more than 4000 global companies that appear on the MSCI World, MSCI Europe, 
STOXX 600, NASDAQ 100, ASX 300 and MSCI Emerging Markets indices” (Ortas et 
al., 2015: 676). Data was collected from 4,877 companies in 57 countries and 10 
economic sectors 1 . As the paper focuses on the interactions between the national 
institutions defining the varieties of institutional systems, companies in the sample from 
countries that were not included in the VIS approach (23 firms) were excluded from the 
sample, leaving 4,854 companies. Those companies that did not have the required data 
                                                            
1 Industry sectors are defined according to Thomson Reuters Business Classification (TRBC) 
system. 
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for the financial control variables (103 firms) were also dropped. After these 
adjustments, the final sample consists of 4,751 companies in 52 countries and operating 
in 10 economic sectors (see Tables A.1 in the Appendix for a complete sample 
breakdown by country). The values of the variables were collected from 2008 to 2015, 
creating an unbalanced, cross-sectional database of 38,008 observations.    
4.2. Variables’ definitions and features 
Carroll (1979) found that ESG performance is a multidimensional construct composed 
of several social and environmental organizational outcomes related to different 
stakeholders, represented by CEP, CSP and CGP. This research responds to a recent call 
made in previous research (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010; 
Huseynov & Klamm, 2012) by considering disaggregated firms’ ESG performance 
measures as dependent variables (i.e., CEP, CSP and CGP). The dependent variables are 
continuous and range from 0 to 100. Their interpretation is straightforward as the higher 
the firms’ score on them, the higher their level of performance (see Table 1 for a 
complete definition of the models’ variables).   
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 Data related to the VIS national institutions were obtained from the 
Fainshmidt et al. (2018). The VIS approach uses qualitative data provided by a panel of 
regional experts to compile the institutional profile of 68 national economies and to 
inductively identify nine national institutional systems using a two-stage analysis 
technique. This approach makes it possible to group countries, not by geographical 
areas as traditionally done, but based on a series of socio-cultural characteristics 
independent of the continent to which the country belongs. This classification is a 
generalized model based on differences in several national institutions (see table 1 for 
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further details): i) the role of the state; ii) the role of financial markets; iii) the role of 
human capital; iv) the role of social capital; and, v) the role of corporate governance. 
 The econometric models include several financial and non-financial control 
variables that have conventionally been associated with firms’ ESG performance to 
avoid biased estimates (Ortas, Gallego-Alvarez & Álvarez-Etxeberria, 2015). The 
financial control variables are: i) company return on assets (ROA); ii) company return 
on equity (ROE); iii) firm size (SIZE), iv) company market to book ratio (MKTBK); iv) 
company ratio between research and development spend and its total net sales 
(R&D/SALES); v) company leverage (LEV). All the data for the financial controls were 
obtained from DataStream®. Discussion of the expected influence of the financial 
controls on different dimensions of firms’ ESG performance has been largely addressed 
in previous research (see Campbell, 2007; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). In addition, a 
dummy variable is included to control for specific interactions between industries and 
firms’ ESG performance (see Table 1 for further details). This is because previous 
research on the topic (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010) found differences across different 
activity sectors. 
4.3. Econometric approach 
This research tests the links of time series data for annual observations of companies 
grouped by country. The dependent variables (CEP, CSP and CGP) are related to the 
company level, the independent variables refer to the country level and financial and 
non-financial controls are measured at the firm level (see Table 3 and Table 4). This 
dataset represents a complex structure that should not be modelled by traditional 
techniques such as conditional mean linear regressions because significant variance of 
the observations is not captured (Hox, 2010; Peterson, Arregle & Martin, 2012). To test 
the working hypotheses, a multilevel modelling technique is proposed (see Bryk & 
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Raudenbusch, 1992). Three levels of analysis are introduced: i) yearly observations of a 
firm CEP, CSP and CGP; ii) the companies; and, iii) the countries. The multilevel 
model makes it possible to divide the variance of the dependent variables into three 
variances: i) variance across observations within companies (level 1); ii) variance across 
companies within countries (level 2); and, iii) variance across countries (level 3). The 
multilevel modelling allows avoiding mis-estimation problems derived from sampling 
fluctuations and a small number of observation through higher levels of analysis 
(Duncan & Jones, 2000). Thus, the unbalanced nature of the dataset will not produce 
biased estimates and standard errors. The proposed model is given by the following 
equation: 
௜ܻ,௝,௞ ൌ ߚ଴,௜,௝,௞ܿ݋݊ݏ ൅ ߚଵ,௝,௞ ଵܺ,௝,௞ ൅ ߚଶ,௞ܺଶ,௞ ൅ ߲଴,௞ ൅ ߝ௢,௝,௞ ൅ ߤ଴,௜,௝,௞ (1) 
where ௜ܻ,௝,௞is the dependent variable for year i of firm j in country k; ߚ଴,௜,௝,௞is the model 
random intercept; ߚଵ,௝,௞  is the firm-level predictor ( ଵܺ,௝,௞ ) random slope;  ߚଶ,௞  is the 
country-level predictor (ܺଶ,௞) random slope; ߤ଴,௜,௝,௞ is the residual of yearly observations; 
ߝ௢,௝,௞  is the residual of firms, and; ߲଴,௞ is the residual of countries. The nature of the 
dataset (i.e. the number of high-level elements – countries – is lower than the number of 
low-level elements – companies) suggests the use of restricted maximum likelihood2 
(REML) because it provides less biased estimates. Following Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 
(2012) possible endogeneity problems are controlled through computing a Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test. The result was not significant (ݔଶ = 0.346; Prob >ݔଶ = 0.462), revealing 
no concern for endogeneity. 
5. Results and discussion 
                                                            
2 Model comparison tests based on likelihood ratios have not been performed because they are 
not useful with the REML estimation method (Bryk & Raudenbusch, 1992). 
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Four models are computed with CEP, CSP and CGP as the dependent variables (see 
Table 5). The first model is an empty model, which addresses how the total variance of 
the dependent variables is divided across years, countries and companies. Model 2 
includes the financial controls and Model 3 adds the non-financial control variables. 
Finally, Model 4 includes all the above-mentioned independent variables. The focus 
will be placed on Model 4 to test the working hypotheses. Descriptive statistics of the 
models’ variables are shown in Table 2. Tables 3 and 4 show the pairwise correlations 
between the dependent variables and the financial controls and the pairwise correlations 
between the dependent and independent variables. It is worth to mention that all the 
variance inflation factors regarding the continuous variables in the models were less 
than one, thus indicating the non-existence of collinearity problems.     
[Insert Table 2, 3 and 4 about here] 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that strong social and environmental regulation shown by 
specific countries such as regulatory states will positively influence firms’ ESG 
performance. The coefficients associated with the REGULAT and WELF variables are 
positive and significant. These results indicate that CEP, CSP and CGP is higher for 
firms in regulatory and welfare countries. This confirms that companies within 
regulatory states consider sustainability issues into their decision-making processes, 
thus increasing their ESG performance, in order to meet regulatory prescriptions. 
Furthermore, firms’ ESG performance in welfare states is also higher. This supports the 
view that firms in welfare states prioritize the social well-being of society and 
environmental preservation. According with these results, H1 cannot be rejected.  
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the existence of developed credit and equity markets 
will positively influence firms’ ESG performance. The coefficients for the EM and CM 
variables are positive and significant at the 1% level for the three dependent variables. 
However, the estimates of the FW variable are not significant. These results reveal that: 
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i) those companies in countries with developed equity and credit markets have higher 
levels of CEP, CSP and CGP; ii) there are non-significant differences between firms’ 
CEP, CSP and CGP in countries with high and low levels of family provided capital for 
company financing; and, iii) companies in countries in which the state acts as the 
primary source of firms’ financing achieve lower levels of ESG performance. The 
superior levels of ESG performance for firms in countries with developed equity and 
credit markets can be due to the greater stakeholder requirements for transparency and 
accountability. On the other hand, in countries where the state provides capital, capital 
development is hindered, leading companies to lower levels of ESG performance 
(Schneider, 2009). Accordingly, these results reveal that H2 cannot be rejected. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that enhanced knowledge capital and coordination with 
labor will positively influence firms’ ESG performance. The multilevel results show 
that both variables that are related with the role of human capital (CWL and KC) have 
positive and significant estimates. These results support hypothesis H3 suggesting that 
firms in countries with enhanced human capital achieve greater levels of ESG 
performance. This is in line with previous studies (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012) that 
address the positive relationship between firms’ CSP and countries’ human capital, but 
it also extends this positive link to companies’ CEP and CGP. This can be explained 
because countries that exhibit higher knowledge capital levels often show solid 
educational systems, which lead them to achieve greater levels of ESG performance. 
The level of knowledge capital within international contexts is important because it 
determines how organizations relate to their employees in productive activities. For 
instance, when knowledge capital is readily available to firms in an economy, they can 
invest in specific skills training, but a scarcity of knowledge capital can reduce 
incentives to invest in particular skills and even sectors. 
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Hypothesis 4 predicted that enhanced generalized trust will positively influence 
firms’ ESG performance. The results support this hypothesis because the estimates of 
the GT variable are positive and significant. This supports previous research findings 
(Kong, 2016), addressing that companies in countries with higher levels of corruption 
often underperform in terms of ESG performance. The results reveal that widespread 
trust and the absence of corruption make firms more likely to develop CSR practices 
that may favor their ESG performance. This result extends previous findings (Ioannou 
& Serafeim, 2012), who addressed that companies that adopt CSR activities are more 
likely to oppose unethical activities and thus contribute to lowering a country’s 
corruption levels. 
The last hypothesis predicted that increased ownership concentration diminishes 
firms’ ESG performance, and that higher levels of family ownership and family 
intervention in management favor firms’ ESG performance. The results associated with 
the OC variable are different for the three dimensions of ESG performance. While the 
estimate is negative and significant for CSP and CGP, the estimates are non-significant 
for CEP. This means that companies in countries with concentrated ownership achieve 
lower performance in social and governance issues. The estimates for the FO and FIM 
variables are positive, significant at the 1% level for the CSP and CEP dimensions, and 
non-significant for CGP. These results are in line with Block and Wagner (2014), who 
concluded that family ownership has different effects on the various dimensions of ESG 
performance. Family ownership is negatively linked with community, but positively 
related to diversity, employees, the environment, and product issues. All of these results 
reveal that H5 cannot be rejected. 
6. Conclusions 
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Academic research has addressed the key role of national institutions in companies’ 
ESG performance. Previous literature focuses on the VoC and NBS approaches to 
explain the differences in company policies and strategies because of their exposure to 
different institutional environments. However, these frameworks do not include 
companies in under-studied countries with high economic potential from Asia, Latin 
America, Africa and Eastern Europe (e.g. BRICS), leading to restricted conclusions. 
This paper is the first to provide a quantitative analysis of how national 
institutions drive or restrict companies’ ESG performance. It uses the novel extension of 
institutional theory called the varieties of institutional systems (VIS). The focus is 
placed on a large dataset of companies from 52 countries to provide efficient 
estimations that allow us to draw conclusions that are more robust.  
Results show that firms in regulatory and welfare states, with high levels of 
knowledge and social capital are more commitment to sustainability issues, and they 
achieve higher levels of ESG performance. Our study extends previous findings about 
the positive influence of human capital on CSP (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012), to CEP 
and CGP. Differences in country profiles of capital providers also drive companies’ 
ESG performance. Companies in countries with developed equity and/or credit markets 
obtain higher levels of ESG performance than those in countries where the state is the 
primary source of companies’ financing. Family ownership lowers companies’ 
performance in community issues but positively influences firms’ performance in 
aspects such as diversity, employees and environmental issues. 
These results have several interesting implications. Firstly, the provided overview 
will allow governments, academics and the society as a whole to better understand 
which national institutions act as catalysts on companies’ ESG performance. This is 
interesting because companies’ ESG performance is the outcome of adopting several 
CSR strategies that contributes to society well-being and environmental preservation. In 
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fact, sustainable development is a global goal, and firms’ ESG performance should be 
enhanced by the adoption of several international policies that have an influence on 
national institutions. Secondly, systemic variations in companies’ competences and 
limitations because of their institutional environment will allow companies’ managers 
to manage their commercial relations with large suppliers worldwide properly. This 
research reveals that international companies do not often have the same priorities in 
CSR terms, and companies aiming to contribute to enhance sustainability and society 
well-being could consider this information when selecting their commercial relations 
with international firms. The conclusions also have implications for companies in 
emerging and less developed countries, which often have restricted equity and credit 
markets and low levels of human and social capital. Those companies should develop 
and integrate stronger CSR policies to enhance their levels of ESG performance to act 
as a good corporate citizen that will contribute to the community development. Finally, 
companies in countries with a low orientation to CSR should clearly understand their 
governments’ expectations for environmental and social aspects to better define their 
own policies and strategies to guarantee their survival in the long-term. 
The provided findings are, however, accompanied by several caveats and 
limitations that are not go unmentioned and provides potential for further research. 
First, the analysis uses indicators to represent firms’ ESG performance (e.g. CEP, CSP 
and CGP). Second, although the focus is placed on a wider sample as required by past 
research, some external validity problems may arise. This is due to the inherent 
sampling process, mergers of the firms. Although the time-span considered comprises 
eight years, results should be interpreted according with the economic, social and 
institutional issues of that period, characterized at the beginning by the negative 
consequences of the global financial crisis and at the end showing clear evidences of 
economic growth in most of the world’s economies. Future research should focus on 
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creating more knowledge about the effect of countries’ interventionism on firms’ ESG 
performance. This is important because some of the economies that will grow most 
rapidly in the next two decades have higher levels of state intervention in company 
management (e.g. China and Russia). If countries’ contributions to sustainability is 
crucial for both the social and economic development of the whole world, there is a 
clear need to understand how these countries can restrict these achievements. 
Furthermore, the role of family as a national institution has scarcely been analyzed in 
previous research. Although the provided findings in this paper are a good starting point 
to understand in which ways national institutions (on a global scale) determine firms’ 
ESG performance, further research is needed to address the firms’ ESG profiles shown 
by corporations across the seven varieties of institutional systems provided by 
Fainshmidt et al. (2018), those being: i) liberal market economies; ii) coordinated 
market economies; iii) state-led; iv) fragmented with fragile state; v) family-led; vi) 
centralized tribe; vii) emergent LME; viii) collaborative agglomerations; and, ix) 
hierarchically coordinated.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Sample breakdown by country 
Country Companies / Obs. 
Percentage 
(%) 
Acc. 
Percentage 
(%) 
Country Companies / Obs. 
Percentage 
(%) 
Acc. 
Percentage 
(%) 
Australia 417 / 3,336 8.78% 8.78% Mexico 54 / 432 1.14% 49.91% 
Austria 21 / 168 0.44% 9.22% Morocco 3 / 24 0.06% 49.97% 
Belgium 30 / 240 0.63% 9.85% Netherlands 39 / 312 0.82% 50.79% 
Brazil 119 / 952 2.50% 12.36% New Zealand 18 / 144 0.38% 51.17% 
Canada 335 / 2,680 7.05% 19.41% Nigeria 1 / 8 0.02% 51.19% 
Chile 25 / 200 0.53% 19.93% Norway 24 / 192 0.51% 51.69% 
China 161 / 1,288 3.39% 23.32% Peru 3 / 24 0.06% 51.76% 
Colombia 15 / 120 0.32% 23.64% Philippines 26 / 208 0.55% 52.30% 
Czech 4 / 32 0.08% 23.72% Poland 31 / 248 0.65% 52.96% 
Denmark 29 / 232 0.61% 24.33% Portugal 13 / 104 0.27% 53.23% 
Egypt 11 / 88 0.23% 24.56% Qatar 13 / 104 0.27% 53.50% 
Finland 36 / 288 0.76% 25.32% Russian Federation 37 / 296 0.78% 54.28% 
France 98 / 784 2.06% 27.38% Saudi Arabia 6 / 48 0.13% 54.41% 
Germany 106 / 848 2.23% 29.61% Singapore 57 / 456 1.20% 55.61% 
Hong Kong 175 / 1,400 3.68% 33.30% South Africa 131 / 1,048 2.76% 58.37% 
Hungary 4 / 32 0.08% 33.38% South Korea 123 / 984 2.59% 60.96% 
India 101 / 808 2.13% 35.51% Spain 57 / 456 1.20% 62.16% 
Indonesia 36 / 288 0.76% 36.27% Sri Lanka 1 / 8 0.02% 62.18% 
Ireland 16 / 128 0.34% 36.60% Sweden 73 / 584 1.54% 63.71% 
Israel 15 / 120 0.32% 36.92% Switzerland 81 / 648 1.70% 65.42% 
Italy 63 / 504 1.33% 38.24% Taiwan 136 / 1,088 2.86% 68.28% 
Japan 441 / 3,528 9.28% 47.53% Thailand 34 / 272 0.72% 69.00% 
Jordan 1 / 8 0.02% 47.55% Turkey 29 / 232 0.61% 69.61% 
Kazakhstan 1 / 8 0.02% 47.57% United Arab 11 / 88 0.23% 69.84% 
Kuwait 4 / 32 0.08% 47.65% United Kingdom 367 / 2,936 7.72% 77.56% 
Malaysia 53 / 424 1.12% 48.77% United States 1,066 / 8,528  22.44% 100.00% 
This table details the distribution of the companies and observations across the different countries. 
The firms’ social and fiscal domicile was used as the criteria when classifying firms across countries. 
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Table 1: Variable definitions, measurements and data sources. 
Variables Definition Source Level 
Dependent variables    
     CSP Corporate social performance: continuous variable ranging from 0 to 100 ASSET4 ESG Firm 
     CEP Corporate environmental performance: continuous variable ranging from 0 to 100 ASSET4 ESG Firm 
     CGP Corporate governance performance: continuous variable ranging from 0 to 100 ASSET4 ESG Firm 
Independent variables    
     DEV Developmental state: binary variable that has a value of 1 for companies in developmental countries and 0 otherwise Fainshmidt et al. (2018) Country 
     DEV&PRED Developmental and predatory state: binary variable that has a value of 1 for companies in developmental and predatory countries and 0 otherwise Fainshmidt et al. (2018) Country 
     PRED Predatory state: binary variable that has a value of 1 for companies in predatory countries and 0 otherwise Fainshmidt et al. (2018) Country 
     WELF Welfare state: binary variable that has a value of 1 for companies in welfare countries and 0 otherwise. Fainshmidt et al. (2018) Country 
     REGULAT Regulatory state: binary variable that has a value of 1 for companies in regulatory countries and 0 otherwise Fainshmidt et al. (2018) Country 
     REGULAT&DEV Regulatory and developmental state: binary variable that has a value of 1 for companies in regulatory and developmental countries and 0 otherwise Fainshmidt et al. (2018) Country 
     CWL 
Coordination with labor: binary variable that has a value of 1 for companies in countries with a high degree of coordination with labor and 0 
otherwise Fainshmidt et al. (2018) Country 
     KC Knowledge capital: binary variable that has a value of 1 for companies in countries with high knowledge capital and 0 otherwise Fainshmidt et al. (2018) Country 
     EM Equity markets: binary variable that has a value of 1 for companies in countries with equity markets and 0 otherwise Fainshmidt et al. (2018) Country 
     CM Credit markets: binary variable that has a value of 1 for companies in countries with credit markets and 0 otherwise Fainshmidt et al. (2018) Country 
     FW 
Family wealth: binary variable that has a value of 1 for companies in countries where the main source of financial capital is family wealth and 0 
otherwise Fainshmidt et al. (2018) Country 
     SPC 
State provided capital: binary variable that has a value of 1 for companies in countries where the main source of financial capital is state-provided 
capital and 0 otherwise Fainshmidt et al. (2018) Country 
     GT 
Generalized trust: binary variable that has a value of 1 for companies in countries where community has a high level of generalized trust in 
society/institutions and 0 otherwise Fainshmidt et al. (2018) Country 
     OC 
Ownership concentration: binary variable that has a value of 1 for companies in countries where firm ownership is highly concentrated and 0 
otherwise Fainshmidt et al. (2018) Country 
     FO Family ownership: binary variable that has a value of 1 for companies in countries where firms are often family owned and 0 otherwise Fainshmidt et al. (2018) Country 
     FIM 
Family intervention in management: binary variable that has a value of 1 for companies in countries where families play a significant role in firms’ 
management and 0 otherwise. Fainshmidt et al. (2018) Country 
     ROA Return on assets: ratio between firms’ pre-tax income and total assets   
     MKTBK Market to book ratio: ratio between companies’ market value of equity and their book value of equity   DataStream Firm 
     R&D/SALES Ratio between a firm’s research and development spend and its total net sales DataStream Firm 
     LEV Leverage: firms’ long-term debt divided by common equity  DataStream Firm 
     ROE Return on equity: ratio between firms’ net income and shareholder equity DataStream Firm 
     SIZE Firms’ size: natural logarithm of companies’ total assets DataStream Firm 
     CYCLICAL Industry dummy: binary variable that has a value of 1 for firms within cyclical sectors and 0 otherwise DataStream Firm 
This table show the relevant information related with models’ dependent and independent variables. 
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Table 2: Summary of the variables’ main descriptive statistics 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Continuous variables 
CEP 31876 51.4858 31.9615 8.29 95.15 
CSP 31876 51.9041 31.0384 3.44 98.07 
CGP 31876 51.3145 30.1776 1.08 97.69 
ROA 34811 5.1261 12.9374 -413.26 396.53 
MKTBK 34341 6.7154 649.0861 -20489.64 115798.3 
R&D/SALES 14491 26.316 1109.436 -286.4 95800 
LEV 35574 136.1699 2333.925 -77921.74 222305.8 
ROE 34511 11.6981 132.825 -8900 11215.38 
SIZE 35591 16.8236 2.8935 3.1355 27.5314 
Categorical variables 
 Obs. 0 (%) 1 (%)   
Industry-related variables 
CYCLICAL 38008 3,678 (9.91%) 34,240 (90.09%)   
Variables defining the varieties of institutional systems 
DEV 38008 34,624 (91.10%) 3,384 (8.90%)   
DEV&PRED 38008 34,928 (91.90%) 3,080 (8.10%)   
PRED 38008 37,488 (98.63%) 520 (1.37%)   
REGULAT 38008 17,248 (45.38%) 20,760 (54.62%)   
REGULAT&DEV 38008 36,256 (95.39%) 1,752 (4.61%)   
WELF 38008 29,496 (77.60%) 8,512 (22.40%)   
CWL 38008 16,000 (42.10%) 22,008 (57.90%)   
KC 38008 5,536 (14.57%) 32,472 (85.43%)   
EM 38008 15,352 (40.39%) 22,656 (59.61%)   
CM 38008 296 (0.78%) 37,712 (99.22%)   
FW 38008 26,584 (69.94%) 11,424 (30.06%)   
SPC 38008 27,904 (73.42%) 10,104 (26.58%)   
GT 38008 14,352 (37.76%) 23,656 (62.24%)   
OC 38008 19,592 (51.55%) 18,416 (48.45%)   
FO 38008 20,160 (53.04%) 17,848 (46.96%)   
FIM 38008 19,736 (51.93%) 18,272 (48.07%)   
This table shows the main descriptive statistics of the models’ variables (see Table 1 for variables’ definition). 
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Table 3: Pairwise correlations between the dependent variables and the financial 
controls. 
 CEP CSP CGP ROA MKTBK R&D/SALES LEV ROE SIZE 
CEP 1         
CSP 0.8161*** 1        
CGP 0.2351*** 0.3268*** 1       
ROA 0.0069 0.0420*** 0.0063 1      
MKTBK -0.0041 0.0003 -0.0083 0.0226*** 1     
R&D/SALES -0.0276*** -0.0208** -0.0029 -0.0669*** 0.0036 1    
LEV 0.0082 0.0056 0.0009 -0.0101* 0.0154*** -0.0003 1   
ROE 0.0161*** 0.0292*** 0.0244*** 0.2447*** 0.0094* -0.0124 -0.0083 1  
SIZE 0.2716*** 0.2028*** -0.4425*** 0.0426*** 0.0093* -0.0339*** 0.0143*** 0.0029 1 
This table shows pairwise correlations between the dependent variables and independent financial control variables. 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, and *** significant 
at the 1% level. 
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Table 4: Correlations between the dependent and independent variables 
 CEP CSP CGP SDD SII DEV DEV&PRED PRED REGULAT REGULAT&DEV WELF CWL KC 
CEP 1             
CSP 0.8161*** 1            
CGP 0.2351*** 0.3268*** 1           
DEV 0.0257*** 0.0209*** -0.3289*** 0.4579*** 1.0000*** 1        
DEV&PRED -0.0683*** -0.0465*** -0.1683*** 1.0000*** 1.0000*** -1.0000*** 1       
PRED -0.0327*** -0.0084 -0.0835*** 0.7760*** 1.0000*** -1.0000*** -1.0000*** 1      
REGULAT -0.1980*** -0.1560*** 0.5610*** -0.9183*** -0.9212*** -1.0000*** -1.0000*** -1.0000*** 1     
REGULAT&DEV -0.0178*** 0.0402*** -0.0028 -0.0455*** -1.0000*** -1.0000*** -1.0000*** -1.0000*** -1.0000*** 1    
WELF 0.2716*** 0.1796*** -0.3171*** 0.4563*** 0.4044*** -1.0000*** -1.0000*** -1.0000*** -1.0000*** -1.0000*** 1   
CWL -0.1529*** -0.1204*** 0.4610*** -0.7328*** -0.6493*** 0.0473*** -0.2997*** -0.7022*** 0.8954*** -0.5380*** -1.0000*** 1  
KC 0.0459*** -0.0316*** 0.1894*** -0.7320*** -0.7278*** -0.3287*** -1.0000*** -0.3484*** 0.8527*** -0.6031*** 1.0000*** 0.5847*** 1 
EM -0.1904*** -0.1153*** 0.5653*** -0.8424*** -0.9168*** -0.4291*** -1.0000*** -1.0000*** 0.9729*** 0.3654*** -0.9527*** 0.7991*** 0.3689*** 
CM 0.0204*** -0.0018 0.0690*** -1.0000*** -1.0000*** 1.0000*** 1.0000*** -1.0000*** 1.0000*** 1.0000*** 1.0000*** 1.0000*** -1.0000*** 
FW 0.2551*** 0.2152*** -0.3713*** 0.5221*** 0.4893*** 0.0255** -1.0000*** -0.4545*** -0.8849*** 0.3613*** 1.0000*** -0.9899*** -0.1838*** 
SPC 0.2195*** 0.1277*** -0.3706*** 0.6218*** 0.5707*** -0.7519*** 0.2287*** 0.3099*** -1.0000*** -1.0000*** 1.0000*** -1.0000*** 0.0659*** 
GT -0.2121*** -0.1609*** 0.4985*** -0.8169*** -0.8778*** -0.3076*** -1.0000*** -1.0000*** 0.9827*** 1.0000*** -1.0000*** 0.8794*** 0.6470*** 
OC 0.1751*** 0.1265*** -0.6102*** 0.8356*** 0.9185*** 1.0000*** 0.5388*** 1.0000*** -0.9629*** 0.1362*** 1.0000*** -0.9553*** -0.7141*** 
FO 0.1619*** 0.0950*** -0.6144*** 0.9147*** 0.9302*** 0.7642*** 1.0000*** -0.0383* -0.9463*** -0.2610*** 1.0000*** -0.9301*** -0.5141*** 
FIM 0.1550*** 0.0938*** -0.6255*** 0.9550*** 0.9648*** 0.7699*** 1.0000*** 1.0000*** -0.9651*** -0.0951*** 1.0000*** -0.9276*** -0.4997*** 
 EM CM FW SPC GT OC FO FIM      
EM 1             
CM 1.0000*** 1            
FW -0.7620*** 1.0000*** 1           
SPC -0.9710*** -1.0000*** 0.9098*** 1          
GT 0.9679*** 1.0000*** -0.8618*** -0.9903*** 1         
OC -0.9507*** -1.0000*** 1.0000*** 1.0000*** -0.9517*** 1        
FO -0.9610*** 1.0000*** 0.8248*** 0.9064*** -09616*** 0.9822*** 1       
FIM -0.9896*** -1.0000*** 0.7868*** 1.0000*** -0.9836*** 0.9783*** 0.9981*** 1      
This table shows the correlations between the models’ dependent and independent variables. Correlations between the dependent variables (i.e. CEP, CSP and CGP) refers to pairwise correlations. 
Correlations between the dependent and the independent variables refer to the point biserial correlation coefficients (significance of biserial correlations has been evaluated by computing the t-ratios 
with N-2 degrees of freedom). Correlations between the independent variables refer to tetrachoric correlation coefficients. * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, and *** 
significant at the 1% level.
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Table 5: Multilevel regression results 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4  
 CEP CSP CGP CEP CSP CGP CEP CSP CGP CEP CSP CGP 
Fixed part             
Control variables             
     INTERCEPT -117.795*** -127.081*** -88.929*** -79.955*** -89.876*** -45.331*** -79.534*** -89.632*** -45.231*** -78.832*** -86.381*** -38.246*** 
     YEAR 0.0585*** 0.0631*** 0.0440*** 0.0398*** 0.0447*** 0.0224*** 0.0393*** 0.0451*** 0.0236*** 0.0492*** 0.0459*** 0.0234*** 
             
     ROA    -0.0078 0.0007 -0.0112** -0.0062 0.0010 -0.0111* -0.0054 0.0011 -0.0111** 
     MKTBK    0.1331 0.0034 -0.0221 0.1470 0.0102 -0.0152 0.1301 0.0101 -0.0134 
     R&D/SALES    0.0005 0.0001 0.0002 0.0006 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0008 0.0001 -0.0001 
     LEV    -0.0048 -0.0079* -0.0012 -0.0041 -0.0078* -0.0007 -0.0049 -0.0078* -0.0008 
     ROE    0.0014 0.0044 0.0043 0.0025 0.0040 0.0041 0.0013 0.0049 0.0041 
     SIZE    0.6707*** 0.6680*** 0.3953*** 0.6834*** 0.6772*** 0.4007*** 0.6973*** 0.6902*** 0.4104*** 
     CYCLICAL       -1.2482*** -1.4672*** -1.1321** -1.2401*** -1.4537*** 0.1309** 
             
Independent variables             
     DEV          0.0201 0.0531 0.0632 
     DEV&PRED          -0.0349 0.0720 -0.0024 
     WELF          4.1301** 3.5735** 7.3004*** 
     REGULAT          2.2452*** 3.0356*** 2.7451** 
     REGULAT&DEV          0.0228 0.0730 -0.0903 
     CWL          1.0823** 1.0011** 1.0579** 
     KC          1.7037** 1.2321** 2.4849** 
     EM          1.2372*** 1.1259*** 1.2743*** 
     CM          1.2283*** 1.3841*** 1.6369*** 
     FW          -0.2829 -0.1712 -0.2042 
     SPC          -1.2391*** -1.4875*** -1.1597*** 
     GT          1.1323** 1.2818** 1.8289** 
     OC          -0.7401 -1.9429*** -1.8392*** 
     FO          1.5998*** 1.4943*** 1.1101 
     FIM          1.4102*** 1.2729*** -0.4529 
             
Random part             
COUNTRY 0.2229 0.2492 0.4381 0.5925 0.5717 0.9428 0.6235 0.6102 0.9551 0.2734 0.3240 0.5281 
FIRM 0.7378 0.7600 0.3114 0.5306 0.5558 0.2179 0.4923 0.5294 0.2204 0.4852 0.5456 0.2543 
RESIDUAL 0.1121 0.1071 0.1137 0.0985 0.1018 0.0996 0.0991 0.1182 0.1032 0.1292 0.1578 0.1439 
VARIANCE EXPLAINED 0.7001 0.7295 0.7134 0.7225 0.7301 0.7256 0.7667 0.7836 0.7739 0.7891 0.7965 0.7854 
This table presents the estimates of Models 1, 2, 3 and 4. See Table 1 for variable definitions. Predatory state is the baseline case for the type of state dummy variables. * Significant at the 10% 
level, ** significant at the 5% level, and *** significant at the 1% level. 
 
